Zinoviev Re-Examined: Comments on Lars Lih’s “Populist Leninist” by Black, T. Clayton
                                                            The NEP Era: Soviet Russia, 1821-1928, 2 (2008), 25-38.  
CLAYTON BLACK (Chestertown, MD, USA ) 
 
 
 
ZINOVIEV RE-EXAMINED: COMMENTS  
ON LARS LIH’S “POPULIST LENINIST” 
 
 
In December 1925, perhaps as he sat watching the drama of the Fourteenth 
Party Congress, Valerii Mezhlauk sketched out a caricature of Grigorii Zino-
viev. In the picture, Zinoviev, who holds suspended above a trunk two over-
sized puppets, one a rotund bourgeois urbanite and the other an equally 
plump well-to-do peasant, addresses his housemaid: “Masha, tonight is the 
plenum of the Central Committee. Please clean the kulak and the nepman, 
and, after I return, sprinkle them with mothballs. 
    Yes, I can use the plump well-to-do peasant, addresses his housemaid:  
“Masha, tonight is the plenum of the Central Committee. Please clean the ku-
lak and the nepman, and, after I return, sprinkle them with mothballs. We 
won’t need them until fall.” Mezhlauk then scribbled on the back “To Zino-
viev.”1   
Mezhlauk’s witty charge struck at the beleaguered Leningrad party leader 
on several levels. First, no one could miss the irony of a communist leader 
ordering about a housemaid, though the presence of such help was not unusu-
al among the party leadership. Zinoviev had developed a reputation for lavish 
living, witnessed in part by his transformation from a pale, sickly looking in-
dividual on his return to Russia with Lenin in April 1917, to the fleshy party 
boss he had since become.
2
 Second (and more important), the drawing ech-
oed V. Bogushevskii’s infamous assertion, made only a few months prior, 
that the well-to-do peasant kulak (and, in Mezhlauk’s rendition, the urban 
bourgeoisie) was merely a “bogey,” meant to frighten the party away from 
conciliatory policies to encourage rural prosperity.
3
 Finally, the implication 
of the second point was that Zinoviev’s opposition to such policies was dis-
ingenuous, that the Leningrad leader knew full well that the revival of capi-
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talism in NEP was an exaggerated threat, and his positions were merely a po-
litical tactic.   
The accusation that Zinoviev’s politics were little more than unprincipled 
maneuvering for power has become part and parcel of his historical profile. 
Lars Lih undertakes, if not a defense, an effort to rescue Zinoviev from the 
charge, apparently leveled at him by Trotsky but repeated with additional in-
sults in E. H. Carr’s Socialism in One Country, that he was “vacillating” and 
inconsistent, an index of the superficiality of his political positions. Lih adds 
to Myron Hedlin’s reassessment of Zinoviev in 1917, finding in the man’s 
words and actions a steady effort to appeal to the broadest possible segments 
of Russian society by attacking “the wall” of bureaucratic apparatus between 
the working masses and party and by promoting state pressure on nepmen 
and kulaks. In this addendum to Lih’s article, I will suggest that this “popu-
list” line in Zinoviev represents a deep anxiety – and perhaps even lingering 
doubts – about genuine support for Bolshevik power.   
E. H. Carr, in his 1958 profile of Zinoviev, adds to Trotsky’s scorn the 
words of Stalin, suggesting that Zinoviev was “wobbling” and that his ideas 
amounted to “hysteria, not a policy,” as well as Bukharin’s slap at Zinoviev’s 
inflated self-importance in his “epoch-making books.”4 Lih is right to point 
out that few, save Lunacharskii or Hedlin, have had a positive word for the 
man.
5
 Indeed, in addition to Angelica Balabanoff’s famous dismissal of Zi-
noviev as “after Mussolini . . . the most despicable individual I have ever 
met,” we have Mary McAuley’s description of him as “emotional, impetuous, 
‘inclined to panic under stress’ according to his enemies, physically prone to 
puffiness, and, one feels, somewhat self-important,”6 as well as Victor 
Serge’s judgment that he was “a remarkable agitator, somewhat vulgar in 
tone, of whom it may be said that he was Lenin’s greatest mistake.”7 Carr 
himself finds Zinoviev an intellectual lightweight and offers this assessment:  
“Zinoviev never succeeded in attaining either depth of conviction or depth of 
understanding; and this innate superficiality, among men who treated the sub-
                                                 
4. Edward Hallett Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: Socialism in One Country 1924-1926, 
(New York: Macmillan, 1958), 1: 156. 
5. A. Lunacharskii, “Grigorii Evseevich Zinov’ev (Radomysl’skii),” in A. Lunacharskii et 
al., Siluety: Politicheskie portrety (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), pp. 294-99. Note that Trotsky 
suggests that Lunacharskii only heaped praise on Zinoviev to elevate the latter’s authority in Pet-
rograd, where he was a relative newcomer when Lunacharskii wrote the piece in 1919. See L. 
Trotskii, Moia zhizn’: Opyt avtobiografii (Moscow: Kniga, 1990), 2: 231 (reprint). 
6. Mary McAuley, Bread and Justice: State and Society in Petrograd, 1917-1922 (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), p. 32. 
7. Victor Serge, Russia Twenty Years After, trans. by Max Schachtman, rev. and ed. by Susan 
Weissman (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1996), p. 153. 
Zinoviev Re-Examined: Comments on Lars Lih’s “Populist Leninist”                              27 
tleties of doctrine with passionate earnestness, won him an uneviable reputa-
tion for shiftiness and lack of scruple.”8   
While chair of the Petrograd soviet and unofficial party boss of the city, 
rumors that Zinoviev spared himself no luxury, living in the Astoria hotel and 
appointing shiny new Packards for himself and his wife, were further sup-
ported by his expanding girth, even during the food-supply crisis of 1919.
9
 
His well-documented high-pitched voice and episodes, such as his “cold feet” 
prior to the October revolution or his reported panic at Iudenich’s approach to 
Petrograd in 1919, add to the picture of a power-hungry petty tyrant whose 
true character was revealed in times of crisis as miserable and craven.
10
 In-
deed, some accounts of Zinoviev’s final moments in 1936 confirm this maud-
lin image of evil, with the condemned man weeping hysterically and unable 
to walk to his place of execution.
11
 
Given such a thorough indictment of Zinoviev’s character flaws, how 
could such an individual come to occupy a position of prominence in the par-
ty and even be recognized as its most outstanding figure after Lenin and Trot-
sky? Lih himself refers to Zinoviev as “the principal spokesman for Bolshe-
vism” in the early 1920s. For arch-critics, such a question has an obvious an-
swer. The perfidy of the Bolshevik leadership requires no additional explana-
tion, so the question is moot. Lenin and Trotsky were something on the order 
of evil geniuses, and Zinoviev owed his position to his slavish loyalty to Len-
in (with the notable exception of his “betrayal” in October), his admitted rhe-
torical gifts, and the minor cult of personality that developed around him. 
Carr notes that Zinoviev worked tirelessly on behalf of the new regime, at 
times unwisely assuming too many responsibilities. And, Carr claims, Zino-
viev’s experience with Lenin in exile and his knowledge of German (famous-
ly demonstrated in a two-hour speech that roused the Independent Social 
Democrats to unite with the KPD in 1920) especially recommended him to 
his position of greatest achievement as head of the Comintern.
12
   
But given the otherwise unsavory aspects of his character, it is difficult to 
understand how Zinoviev could have won the loyalty of others. Lev Kame-
nev, whose name is most closely associated with Zinoviev’s, shares few of 
his comrade’s flaws and is generally treated with some sympathy. Likewise, 
Lenin’s wife, Nadezhda Krupskaia, enjoyed a long association with Zinoviev, 
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in whom she confided as the struggle against Stalin’s growing power intensi-
fied. Finally, can we conclude that the Leningrad party leadership was drawn 
to Zinoviev only by virtue of his power?   
At present there seems no need to rework the historical record to make a 
revolutionary saint of Grigorii Zinoviev. Even though most of the negative 
appraisals have either come from his obvious political opponents or have 
been based on those accounts, the volume of material attesting to his faults 
would make such a task a sisyphean endeavor. Nevertheless, Lih’s re-
examination of Zinoviev’s record of political positions, while not whitewash-
ing the blemishes of his personal character, does suggest that we should take 
a second look not only at Zinoviev but at the nature of the debates that rent 
the party in the 1920s.   
Before we look more closely at the substance of Lih’s argument, it is 
worth pausing for a moment on the accusation of inconsistency itself and 
why it might be relevant to our understanding of intraparty feuds of the 
1920s. Carr presents perhaps the fullest elaboration of Zinoviev in this re-
gard; but it is important to note that the charge of vacillation he offers comes 
primarily from Trotsky, who, despite his brief alliance with Zinoviev in 
1926-27, had little reason to look with favor on the former triumvir.
13
 Zino-
viev emerged as the chief conspirator against Trotsky in 1923, and together 
with Kamenev he turned the turned the neologism “Trotskyism” into a term 
of opprobrium, equating it with Menshevism.
14
 Until early 1925, Zinoviev 
was the principal voice in the campaign against Trotsky, a dubious honor for 
which he established a pattern of calumny that would ultimately be used 
against him. By the time Trotsky wrote Moia zhizn’ in 1930, Zinoviev had 
bowed to party discipline and renounced his opposition and union with Trot-
sky, so there is no surprise that Trotsky should have seen in him an unreliable 
ally. In addition, however, Trotsky believed (as have historians since) that 
Zinoviev changed his position with regard to NEP, shifting from champion-
ship of the peasantry (indeed, his main charge against Trotsky had been “ne-
glect of the peasantry”) to the left opposition’s calls to accumulate resources 
on behalf of industry, thus favoring the working class.
15
   
But rather than take Trotsky’s position for granted, we should look closely 
at Carr’s choice of translation from Trotsky’s memoir. Carr selects “incorri-
gible vacillations” for the Russian neizbezhnye kolebaniia. Such a choice 
might be warranted if Trotsky had repeatedly referred to the instability of Zi-
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noviev’s positions in his text. When Carr couples it with Stalin’s charge of 
“wobbling” at the fourteenth party congress, such a translation appears justi-
fied. But the two accusations refer to different moments in different contexts. 
Stalin’s concerned what he believed was Zinoviev’s turnabout on peasant 
policy between the fourteenth conference in April 1925, the October plenum 
of that same year, and the fourteenth congress in December.
16
 By contrast, 
Trotsky was writing of Zinoviev’s neizbezhnye kolebaniia with regard to 
Comintern relations with the British Trade Union Council and Trotsky’s in-
sistence that the Comintern break with it after the failure of the general strike 
in 1926. Though it is possible that Trotsky’s use of the word neizbezhnye is a 
reference to personal weakness, inconsistency is not a theme he pursues in his 
memoir when characterizing Zinoviev (cowardice and treachery, perhaps, but 
not inconsistency). In fact, Trotsky has next to nothing to tell us about the 
substance of the intra-party debates of 1924 and 1925. Zinoviev’s sole con-
tribution at that point appears to be as Trotsky’s chief antagonist. When Trot-
sky speaks of Zinoviev in 1926, however, the two are allies. Far more likely 
than a slam against Zinoviev’s inconsistency, then, is the possibility that 
Trotsky is referring to the difficulty Zinoviev faced, still as chairman of the 
Comintern, in deciding to call for a break with the British Trade Unions 
Council, a choice with profound implications for the future of the communist 
movement in England and the West generally. The choice would have set Zi-
noviev at clear odds with Stalin and the Central Committee once again and 
risked disrupting unity in the Comintern at a time when Russia’s leaders were 
hoping for a revival of revolutionary enthusiasm in the West.
17
 Thus, some 
wavering on the question was, in this sense, unavoidable – neizbezhnoe – ra-
ther than typical (tipichnoe or svoistvennoe emu). Far from sniping at the 
shallowness of Zinoviev’s political convictions, Trotsky could as easily have 
been referring to the gravity of the question for the Comintern head. 
Returning to Carr, we can see that, of the testimonials he provides of Zi-
noviev’s flip-flopping, only Stalin’s speaks unambiguously to such a flaw. 
Given that his charge was leveled amid a concerted campaign against Zino-
viev and the Leningrad opposition in December 1925, it would seem im-
portant that we use caution before accepting the accusation. Zinoviev insisted 
that he still supported the resolutions of the fourteenth conference – which al-
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lowed the leasing of peasant lands, lightened the tax burden on peasants, and 
freed prices on grain and agricultural products 
18
 – but Stalin claimed that Zi-
noviev had first argued that Lenin’s prescriptions for relations with the peas-
antry could be read like a textbook and needed no amendment; he then, Stalin 
argued, went on to speak of “neutralizing” the middle peasant (seredniak), 
while Lenin had quite clearly advocated a “firm alliance” with the seredniak. 
Thus, according to the general secretary, Zinoviev was guilty of “underesti-
mating” the middle peasants. Stalin conceded that Zinoviev had reaffirmed 
the importance of the seredniak in his report on the Central Committee to the 
Leningrad organization, but he did so only after criticism from other TsK 
members. Until that moment, Zinoviev had allegedly all but ignored the vital 
role of the seredniak and said nothing about Lenin’s call for the development 
of cooperatives.
19
 Though Zinoviev may once have spoken proudly of having 
a pro-peasant bias (uklon), his recent shifts had made him an unreliable au-
thority vis-à-vis the peasantry: “as the facts show, Com. Zinoviev has never 
suffered from that firmness of line in peasant policy that we need (Ap-
plause).”20   
Stalin’s attack was devastating to Zinoviev for two reasons. First, no one 
could have missed the irony of Zinoviev being accused of neglecting even a 
part of the peasantry when Zinoviev had himself charged Trotsky with ne-
glecting the peasantry during the controversies of 1923. Second, Stalin had 
made his case precisely in Zinoviev’s style, lacing his speech with abundant 
quotes from Lenin and using Zinoviev’s own words against him. Stalin 
seemed to be defeating Zinoviev at his own game, and he had chosen possi-
bly the most damaging claim to achieve it: inconsistency, which implied shal-
lowness and lack of commitment.   
Bukharin further weakened Zinoviev’s positions on state capitalism by 
pointing out his flaws in interpreting Lenin and reiterating his omission of the 
seredniak in his recent book, Leninizm. But inconsistency was not among 
Bukharin’s criticisms.21 Of course, considering that Bukharin had been forced 
more than once to recant his notorious call to peasants to “enrich them-
selves,” he may not have been in a position to level such a charge. Just as 
likely, however, is the possibility that Bukharin was engaging Zinoviev on 
the points with which the latter had attacked him, namely, the nature of the 
New Economic Policy in the construction of socialism. Zinoviev had not 
sinned by changing his stance with regard to the peasantry, as Stalin would 
color it, but in the way he interpreted the meaning of the conference and ple-
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num resolutions. For Bukharin, this was the central issue, and he targeted Zi-
noviev’s interpretations first and foremost. Stalin instead understood Zino-
viev’s position as deviation from an agreed-upon line, opening him to the 
charge of inconsistency. 
Thus Stalin was primarily responsible for characterizing Zinoviev as a po-
litical wobbler, and he based his evaluation on Zinoviev’s apparent flip-
flopping on peasant policy over the course of 1925. Carr generalized from the 
specific charge, embellishing it with snippets of equally unfavorable but not 
always relevant portraits from other antagonists. Such a realization does not 
require that we begin to see Zinoviev as any less than a distasteful individual. 
It does, however, prompt a more serious consideration of the man as a thinker 
and political leader than we have to date.   
Stalin’s characterization had two important consequences. First, it ren-
dered Zinoviev’s political judgments flimsy and opportunistic (witness 
Mezhlauk’s caricature). Stalin’s response to Zinoviev may or may not have 
been the most damaging at the fourteenth congress itself – Bukharin’s speech 
and the circus-like atmosphere achieved that equally well – but the implica-
tion that Zinoviev’s positions were simply hastily considered posturing has 
had a long life in the historiography. Second, and following from the first, the 
impression has persisted that the social, political, and economic issues con-
fronting the Bolshevik leadership were of secondary importance to Zinoviev, 
who was inclined to use them more for personal political gain than out of any 
genuine conviction. Here again, Carr accepts such a view, arguing that, after 
the thirteenth party conference of January 1924, “it could be clearly seen that 
personalities rather than principles were at stake.”22 With the possible excep-
tion of Stalin himself, no figure has borne this charge more than Zinoviev. 
As a result, traditional historiography of early NEP political struggles pays 
little attention to the content of Zinoviev’s arguments, dismissing him primar-
ily for his political ineptitude and dogmatic reverence for Lenin. Lih has 
therefore provided a valuable service, beginning a discussion that redirects 
our attention from the skullduggery of the succession struggle to the funda-
mental problems vexing the Bolsheviks: how to build socialism and how a 
socialist society should be governed. Theorizing about the former suited the 
intellectual predispositions of most leaders (Zinoviev included), but the latter 
involved immediate concerns that could not be ignored.   
Lih attributes the emergence of a “wall” both within the party and between 
the party and its constituency to the demands of administering the state, the 
emergencies of war and economic collapse, the monopoly of political power, 
and the “cultural gap” between leaders and followers. Zinoviev, by Lih’s tell-
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ing, was worried that the otorvannost’ of party and working masses would 
turn the party into a “mandarin sect” and sought to increase mass participa-
tion in the soviets and the party as well. This argument requires qualification. 
For if Zinoviev worried about corruption born of the party’s monopoly on 
power, he was also a defender of its “leading role,” referring to the system 
approvingly as a “dictatorship of the party” rather than of the proletariat. He 
elaborated on this stance at the Twelfth Congress, speaking of the suppres-
sion of the Bolsheviks’ opponents and of a “single, strong, powerful TsK, 
which governs everything,” including soviets, unions, cooperatives, and the 
entire working class.
23
 Although he agreed that excessive centralization of 
power in soviet executive committees (ispolkomy) needed to be avoided, he 
repeatedly insisted on the party’s prerogative to select ispolkomy and to direct 
the work of the soviets.
24
 
To reconcile these positions, it is important to note that Zinoviev accepted 
the notion of the party both as the country’s exclusive political power and as 
a vehicle for raising the cultural and political level of the working masses.
25
 
He sought the transformation of the party through the inclusion of larger 
numbers of workers or poor peasants as well as the transformation of those 
groups through their involvement with the party: “The party grows from the 
working class. Here before us is not a one-sided process of the vanguard’s in-
fluence over the remainder of the class but a two-sided process of mutual in-
fluence.”26 As for the soviets, the party must not be allowed to replace them 
in their work, but they needed “to attract non-party workers, to be able, as 
Lenin expressed it, ‘to build communism with the hands of others,’ to train 
the broad masses to observe strict revolutionary legality.”27 The party was 
thus to play the role both of ruler and mentor until the classless society had 
been achieved. 
That Zinoviev should protest the growing bureaucratization of the party 
also requires explanation, for that was one of Trotsky’s principal concerns 
precisely when Zinoviev was leading the triumvirate with Kamenev and Sta-
lin in its attack on him. How do we account for this apparent contradiction? 
First, Trotsky seems to have encountered relatively little resistance on this 
score. That the party had become heavy with white-collar employees was the 
source of widespread displeasure – a sentiment that Zinoviev shared. His had 
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been a voice of alarm after the civil war regarding the de-proletarianization 
both of the party and of Russia’s industrial centers. Given the hostility to the 
regime expressed in Tambov, Kronstadt, Siberia, and the Far East, not to 
mention the distaste with which otherwise pro-Bolshevik workers accepted 
the concessions of NEP, most leaders were well aware of the need to re-
establish tight bonds with the working masses. This reason, more than sym-
pathy for the passing of Lenin, necessitated the massive enrollment of work-
ers into the party in 1924.   
But rather than concern about links with the masses, Trotsky’s complaint 
was directed at the decline of openness at the top of the organization. He felt 
himself increasingly cut off from discussions regarding appointments and the 
setting of agendas; and rather than the open and lively debates that had char-
acterized party decision-making under Lenin, even during the civil war, gov-
ernance was turning increasingly into a matter of administration, routines 
based on protocol and direction from above. Gone were the days when per-
sonal charisma reigned supreme. The forces of hierarchy, procedure, and par-
ty discipline were supplanting it, and atop that administrative hierarchy stood 
Stalin, whose antipathy to Trotsky was long-standing and well known. Lih 
suggests that Zinoviev may have shared Trotsky’s worries about the decline 
of broad participation in decision-making.  Indeed, that concern lay behind 
the conspiratorial meeting Zinoviev convened in a cave in Kislovodsk with 
Bukharin, Voroshilov, Evdokimov, and Lashevich in August 1923, apparent-
ly to curtail much of the power that Stalin had accumulated in the Or-
gbureau.
28
   
So why should Zinoviev have acted as such a vigorous opponent of Trot-
sky in 1923 and 1924? Clearly he mistrusted the sincerity of Trotsky’s com-
plaint and feared that his leadership would open the door wider to dictator-
ship than current tendencies were taking the party. But Zinoviev had more to 
consider regarding his position vis-à-vis Trotsky than the question of democ-
racy in the party. Trotsky had repeatedly taken stances on the extreme left 
that threatened, in Zinoviev’s view, the party’s relationship to workers and 
the bulk of the peasantry. Trotsky’s call for the militarization of labor had 
shocked many in the Central Committee and was precisely the recipe to en-
flame emotions rather than attract worker support. By contrast, Zinoviev had 
hewn to a moderate line, preferring to draw the support of workers by poli-
cies with immediate appeal rather than by coercion. The need for the approv-
al of the working masses, indeed, lay behind his “betrayal” of Lenin in Octo-
ber 1917, fearful as he and Kamenev were that a seizure of power before the 
Second Congress of Soviets would actually repel workers and set the move-
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ment back indefinitely.
29
 Moreover, as the person in charge of heavy indus-
try, Trotsky, with help from Piatakov, was instrumental to proposals to shut 
key factories, including Putilov and the Briansk combine, in a radical concen-
tration move that was highly unpopular.
30
 His plans (with Preobrazhensky) 
for “primitive socialist accumulation” also suggested to Zinoviev a desire to 
coerce the agricultural sector precisely at the moment when the party most 
needed its support.   
Lih’s assertion that Zinoviev saw the application of pressure to the kulak 
as a move calculated to win the support of poor and middle peasants helps to 
complete the picture of a man vitally concerned to cement the relationship 
between the party and populace. Zinoviev wanted to encourage cooperatives 
among the bedniaks and seredniaks to win the battle of kto kogo. Their victo-
ry, he argued, required the cultural leadership of the urban proletariat, which 
held state power in its hands.  In “On Cooperation,” Lenin had argued, “the 
union of [the] proletariat with the many millions of small and smallest-scale 
[melkikh i mel’chaishikh] peasants, provided with leadership from the prole-
tariat in relation to the peasantry etc. – is that not all that is needed . . . for the 
complete socialist society?”31 Rather than paying lip service to NEP while 
imposing policies that would surely alienate the party’s constiuents (as Trot-
sky seemed to want), Zinoviev wanted to use the NEP to ensure the alliance 
of workers with lower and middle peasants against bourgeois and kulak influ-
ences, thus winning support for Bolshevik power among the largest segment 
of the population.   
By mid-1925, however, having defeated Trotsky’s risky social engineering 
proposals, it seemed to Zinoviev that many of his comrades in the Central 
Committee were downplaying the importance of class struggle to the party’s 
most important sources of support. Whether recanted or not, Bukharin’s call 
for peasant enrichment, combined with Bogushevskii’s claim that the kulak 
was a “bogey,” suggested a willingness to open the door wide to unfettered 
capitalist development in the countryside – a clear victory for the kulak.  Zi-
noviev’s critics accused him either of neglecting or underestimating the 
seredniak as the proletariat’s chief ally in the countryside and counterweight 
to the kulak, but Zinoviev countered that his position did not necessarily 
mean abandonment of conciliation toward the middle peasants. Talk of “neu-
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tralizing” the seredniak reflected his conviction that a backward slide in agri-
culture, such as occurred with the harvest of 1924, would intensify class an-
tagonisms, and seredniaks could as easily gravitate toward the kulaks as the 
bedniaks. As Carr points out, well-publicized assaults on rural correspondents 
and rural revolts in Georgia seemed to confirm the impression of sharpening 
class conflicts among the peasantry, so the party’s task was to position itself 
on the side of the poor peasants in alliance with urban workers.
32
 An exclu-
sive orientation toward the middle peasant would turn the latter into kulaks 
and leave the poor peasants still at the mercy of rural exploiters. Moreover, 
such an approach threatened to rupture the smychka, as urban workers would 
find themselves at the mercy of high prices for agricultural goods. In his re-
sponse to criticism, Zinoviev argued that workers understood relations with 
the peasantry “from the point of view of class struggle” and that union with 
the seredniak had to be achieved “not over the head of the bedniak” but while 
maintaining a strong bond with the latter.
33
 
Zinoviev’s insistence on upholding the alliance between the poor peasant-
ry and workers reflected his experience as the chair of the Leningrad soviet. 
Over the course of 1925, voices of protest against rising prices and disparities 
of wealth grew steadily. As I have shown elsewhere, assertions that the party 
organization of the northern capital simply followed the line of its undisputed 
party boss do not hold up to scrutiny.
34
 If loyalty had been their principal 
concern, the city’s party leaders would certainly have folded before the 
weight of Central Committee pressure much more rapidly than they did, es-
pecially once Zinoviev’s isolation became clear. Moreover, given the prevail-
ing characterizations of Zinoviev, it is hard to imagine that he could have en-
gendered such selfless devotion. More likely is the possibility that the Lenin-
grad leaders such as union head Glebov-Avilov, Leningradskaia pravda edi-
tor Safarov, guberniia party secretary Zalutskii, district party leader Sarkis, 
and propagandist Tarkhanov understood that supporting policies of concilia-
tion – especially ones that encouraged the enrichment of a rural bourgeoisie 
while denying that it represented a threat – would make them especially un-
popular in the most proletarian city in the country.
35
 
Zinoviev may indeed have been cynically using the urban bourgeoisie and 
well-to-do kulak for political ends, as his critics charged. Nevertheless, he 
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understood that, if class enemies did not draw the ire of the lower classes for 
economic problems, the party itself would be their target. Zinoviev was well 
aware that labor unrest had become a consistent problem in all of the USSR’s 
industrial centers. During the civil war, thousands of workers in Petrograd 
vented their frustrations in protest meetings and strikes, such as that of July 2, 
1918, in which roughly twenty thousand took part.
36
 Anti-Bolshevik leaflets 
and agitational speeches were a regular feature of such demonstrations, and 
only through force was the new government able to suppress them. Just prior 
to the introduction of NEP, Petrograd’s economic crisis once again pushed 
the city to the brink of political upheaval. Over the course of February 1921, 
complaints about wages, working conditions, and food supply quickly 
evolved into political demands, including calls for the return of the Constitu-
ent Assembly.
37
 Intensive agitation, together with the brutal crushing of the 
Kronstadt rebellion and the turn to the NEP, helped restore Bolshevik control. 
But though political opposition had been forced underground, strikes and 
work stoppages (volynki) – most commonly over delayed wage payments – 
remained a persistent headache for union and party leaders. The number of 
large-scale strikes declined in 1923, but though industry seemed to stabilize, 
the introduction of piece-rate wages in late 1924, combined with frequent late 
payments, rising prices, frustrations with norm-setting, the apparent weakness 
of the unions, and resentment at privileges accorded to spetsy (often so-called 
former [byvshie] people), meant that hostility toward the state simmered just 
beneath the surface.
38
 Indeed, 1926 saw a sharp increase in strikes and volyn-
ki with the efforts to cut costs further in the “regime of economy.” 
Leningrad party leaders could not have missed the signals of mounting 
anger from workers over their poor state. Factory, district, city, and guberni-
ia-level meetings all featured constant complaints that nepmen and former 
nobles seemed to be the only people faring well in the new economy. Zino-
viev claimed in late 1923 that workers had told him that conditions for the 
city’s workers were worse than almost anywhere in the country.39 Factory 
party cells also gave increasing indications of political opposition on the shop 
floor. The Putilov locomotive-mechanical shop, for example, reported in June 
1925, that “there no doubt exists an active group of our opponents [in the 
shop], who are conducting fairly energetic propaganda among the workers” 
                                                 
36. M. V. Shkarovskii, “Dokumenty TsGA Sankt-Peterburga o trudovykh konfliktakh v 
1918-1928 gg.,” in Iu. I. Kir’ianov et al., Trudovye konflikty v sovetskoi Rossii 1918-1929 gg. 
(Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1998), p. 86. 
37. Shkarovskii, “Dokumenty TsGA,” pp. 87-88. 
38. I have treated this growing hostility in “Manufacturing Communists: Krasnyi Putilovets 
and the Politics of Soviet Industrialization, 1923-1932,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana Univ., 1996, 
pp. 55-95. 
39. Petrogradskaia pravda, Nov. 27, 1923. 
Zinoviev Re-Examined: Comments on Lars Lih’s “Populist Leninist”                              37 
and who complained about the bureaucracy of the soviets and spread rumors 
about the luxurious privileges of OGPU workers and Zinoviev himself.
40
 The 
factory party committee in September informed guberniia secretary Zalutskii 
of a “growth of elements of dissatisfaction” which presented an “imposing 
threat” of acquiring a “political character.”41 
From the perspective of Leningrad, then, it is not surprising that Zinoviev 
should want to keep the party focused on class enemies. Given that the city’s 
workers were feeling betrayed by a state that exploited labor no less than the 
pre-revolutionary regime and presided over a return to galling class dis-
crepencies, Zinoviev could see that the celebration of bourgeois enrichment 
that Bukharin’s line implied was an invitation to a complete loss of support 
for the party from its principal constituents.   
The concessions to peasants made at the fourteenth conference in April 
1925, did not contradict Zinoviev’s understanding of correct agricultural pol-
icy, at least as long as they did not imply a repudiation of the alliance with 
the bedniaks or struggle against the kulak and nepman. He was not advocat-
ing a “squeezing” of the peasantry à la Preobrazhenskii but a determined ef-
fort to provide credit and material support, along with an invigoration of rural 
soviets, to bedniaks and cooperatives of poor and middle peasants to guaran-
tee their political support. These were precisely the points to which the Cen-
tral Committee agreed at the October plenum; but a separate point of the ple-
num resolutions made possible Zinoviev’s isolation in the coming months.42 
The CC unanimously agreed that two current “dangers” faced the party: un-
derestimation of the negative sides of NEP, on the one hand, and failure to 
understand NEP’s importance, on the other. In the following months, howev-
er, Zinoviev’s opponents reworked the formulation to say that, at present, the 
latter was the greater danger. The Moscow guberniia party conference had 
explicitly renounced the second “deviation,” calling for “decisive” struggle 
against it, and Stalin in his opening speech at the December congress argued 
that the party “should concentrate its fire on” the deviation that inflated the 
role of the kulak.
43
 Thus, Zinoviev could claim, with some justification, that 
it was Stalin, not he, who had changed his position with regard to CC resolu-
tions.  
The political struggles of 1924 and 1925 between Zinoviev and his former 
allies in the triumvirate obviously entailed Machiavellian tactics of the high-
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est order. As the fourteenth congress approached, both the Leningrad leader-
ship and its opponents in the Central Committee and Moscow organization 
moved to broadcast their ideological positions and suppress dissent among 
subordinates. The historical record, however, thanks to the lasting power of 
Stalin’s characterization of Zinoviev as an inconsistent opportunist and wide-
spread sympathy for Bukharin’s “alternative” to Stalinism, continues to be 
dismissive of Zinoviev’s ideological stance as mere political posturing. Hesi-
tation, even fear, at critical moments may have been his most pronounced 
weakness. Indeed, this seems to have been the crux of Lenin’s criticism when 
he inveighed against the “strikebreakers” of October.44 But Lih’s argument 
helps us see that such a shortcoming should not be conflated with incon-
sistency of political conviction. What emerges from this re-examination of 
Zinoviev – an endeavor that surely requires more extensive study of the 
available sources – is a portrait of a man deeply anxious about popular sup-
port for the Bolshevik regime. That anxiety had led him to protest Lenin’s 
call for a seizure of power in 1917, but it appears that his doubts then were 
eased neither by victory in October nor in the civil war. Until revolution 
brought socialism to power in the advanced capitalist countries, the party 
would have to chart a precarious course that at once rebuilt the economy 
without betraying the very people in whose name it claimed to rule.  
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